This week the US Department of Defense released 2020's first quarter report of Operation Pacific Eagle. This report covers the months of January-March. Let's take a look at their assessment of the war against terrorism the Philippines. The full report can be read here.
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| https://media.defense.gov/2020/May/12/2002298246/-1/-1/1/OPERATION%20PACIFIC%20EAGLE-PHILIPPINES%20IN%20BRIEF,%20JANUARY%201,%202020-MARCH%2031,%202020.PDF |
This quarter, the DoS reported that it provided assistance to Philippine partners countering violent extremism, including courses and counseling through the DoS Antiterrorism Training Assistance program on digital forensics, investigating foreign terrorist fighters, crisis management, protecting soft targets, and other capabilities. The DoS also provided support to local governments in the Muslim-majority provinces of the southern Philippines with the goal of enhancing their ability to identify and address drivers of violent extremism.
This quarter, USAID again reported that it provided assistance, including cash grants, hygiene supplies, and emergency relief kits, to internally displaced persons (IDP) in the southern Philippines. USAID reported that approximately 66,000 people remain displaced from the 2017 siege of Marawi this quarter. An additional 52,000 people from other areas of the island of Mindanao were displaced this quarter due to insecurity and violent conflict. USAID reported to the USAID OIG that AFP military operations against ISIS-affiliated militants in Maguindanao province resulted in the displacement of 356 households. Natural disasters, such as earthquakes, further contributed to the number of IDPs in the region.
According to USAID, the Philippine government closed the last remaining tent camps for Marawi IDPs and relocated the families from those camps to a transitional shelter site. USAID reported that it provided rent subsidies or transitional shelters to 470 displaced households.
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Not only is the DoD providing military support to the AFP but the Department of State is also providing assistance to various groups through their Antiterrorism Training Assistance program. USAID is also providing assistance to IDPs and reports that the government has finally closed the last remaining tent camps for Marawi IDPs. That is a story I have missed and do not recall seeing in the mainstream media. The UNHCR has a write up about it.
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| https://www.unhcr.org/ph/17719-feb2020-enews-marawi.html |
The government and its partners began moving the internally displaced last 05 December 2019. By 25 January 2020, the last 64 families were moved to Rorogagus Transitory Site. The 200 families are now in four different transitory sites across the city. It was the last of evacuation centers that served to shelter the internally displaced.
While there is a story about this from the PIA it seems everyone else completely missed it.
This quarter’s report on Operation Pacific Eagle–Philippines (OPE-P) contains limited information from official Department of Defense (DoD) sources. Each quarter, the DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) submits questions to DoD components and offices in order to obtain data and information for this report. Over the course of the last year, the DoD has been reducing the amount of publicly releasable information it provides to the DoD OIG regarding OPE-P.
In particular, the DoD declined to respond to most questions regarding the potential effects of the Philippine government terminating the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The DoD stated that any information on this topic would be pre-decisional. Therefore, this report’s analysis of the VFA, and the Philippine government’s decision to withdraw from it, is based on Department of State (DoS) responses to the DoS OIG and open source reporting.
While the termination of the VFA would not abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty, it would complicate the DoD’s ability to fulfill its obligations under the treaty, according to the Congressional Research Service. According to media reports, the full consequences of ending the VFA are unknown. Philippine Secretary of Justice Menardo Guevarra recommended that the Philippine Department of National Defense and Department of Foreign Affairs conduct a study on possible implications for the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. This is a separate but complementary agreement, under which the U.S. Government is currently constructing military facilities on Philippine military bases to be jointly operated by both countries.
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) stated to the DoD OIG that it plans to continue partner force development efforts in the Philippines, which began long before OPE-P. However, according to USINDOPACOM, the termination of the VFA would create challenges to the type and amount of aid that the DoD would be able to offer. USINDOPACOM said that it plans to continue providing assistance in line with mutual security priorities to the extent allowed by the Philippine government. USINDOPACOM also stated that partner force development this quarter was ongoing, and any interruptions were due entirely to the coronavirus disease–2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. However, USINDOPACOM added that “the larger impact of the VFA cancellation has not yet been determined.”
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Duterte's decision to scrap the VFA will have far reaching consequences and if it pushes through will seriously hamper the efforts of Operation Pacific Eagle. But there will be no details from the DoD at this time as to what the consequences might actually be. However USINDOPACOM plans to continue with their assistance to the AFP and such assistance is ongoing.
In a March cable, the U.S. Embassy in Manila reported that it used media campaigns to highlight the benefits of military-to-military engagements and implicitly demonstrate the consequences of President Duterte’s decision to abrogate the VFA. According to the cable, this media campaign described several U.S. military community engagements, including construction of a two-classroom schoolhouse, a U.S–Philippine joint special forces training in Palawan, and an education outreach visit to a Palawan daycare center by a U.S. Army civil affairs team and the Philippine Coast Guard.
In the cable, the embassy reported that this media campaign generated significant local coverage, and Philippine media made the connection between U.S. military assistance and Philippine security, commenting on what the Philippines stands to lose without the VFA. However, the embassy reported in the cable that the Philippine Department of National Defense prohibited media coverage of future bilateral activities and commemoration events, including the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II. In the cable, the embassy reported that the prohibition of media coverage of these events was done to avoid appearing out of line with Duterte’s directive to reduce bilateral military engagement even before the VFA withdrawal takes effect.
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The U.S. Embassy in Manila engaged in propaganda to highlight the benefits of the VFA and demonstrate the consequences of its abrogation. Meanwhile the PH Department of National Defense has prohibited media coverage from bilateral and commemoration events with the US to "avoid appearing out of line with Duterte's directive to reduce bilateral military engagement." What does that say for free press in the Philippines?
On April 1, Secretary of National Defense Lorenzana referred to COVID-19 and internal security threats as “enemies on two fronts” and welcomed the recent surrenders of 29 jihadist militants and 40 communist insurgents. Lorenzana stated that the AFP was continuing to conduct security operations but, in a cable, the U.S. Embassy in Manila expressed the view that the AFP lacked the capacity to conduct sustained counterterrorism operations while also combating COVID-19. According to the cable, military aircraft, such as the Philippine Air Force’s C-130 cargo plane, which normally provides logistical support to AFP operations on Mindanao, had instead been flying to and from Fuzhou, China, to retrieve medical supplies. Similarly, the cable reported, the Philippine Navy had dispatched some of its ships to deliver relief goods to remote island communities in Tawi-Tawi province.
In the cable, the U.S. Embassy in Manila reported that Philippine military commanders had suspended large formations, and that several troops, including some senior officers, had contracted the virus. The cable stated that, although the Philippine forces were able to recover a hostage from an ISIS-affiliated kidnap-for-ransom group on March 24, COVID-19 had placed significant operational constraints on the AFP, which would limit their ability to deter terrorist operations.
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It may be that the AFP has been distracted by COVID-19 but as we have seen in the past several blog posts they have consistently been battling the NPA as they have attempted to disrupt the distribution of goods. They may be stretched and constrained but the AFP has mettle and has not let up one bit.
According to media reports, in early March, a week-long AFP offensive in Maguindanao province (see map below) resulted in the deaths of at least 14 militants aligned with ISIS-EA. Four Philippine soldiers were also killed in the fighting. An AFP spokesperson told reporters that Philippine forces launched air strikes and artillery fire on an ISIS-EA encampment in the town of Ampatuan on southern Mindanao, after receiving intelligence that the militants were plotting attacks. These strikes were followed by an AFP assault on a second militant camp in another neighborhood of Ampatuan, in which soldiers seized rearms, ammunition, and improvised explosive devices.
This quarter, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reported that it did not observe any significant clashes between ISIS-EA and the AFP. USINDOPACOM stated that it considers the fighting in Ampatuan this quarter to be a low-level incident, given the number of individuals, level of rearms, and casualties involved.
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The DIA says there were no significant clashes between ISIS-EA and the AFP. However it must be remembered that this report does not include the April incident where 12 AFP soldiers were killed in a clash against the Abu Sayyaf.
This quarter, the DIA provided no estimates on ISIS-EA force strength, territory, financing, or recruitment. In previous quarters, USINDOPACOM reported to the DoD OIG that ISIS-EA had an estimated 300 to 500 members in the Philippines divided among several factions, including ISIS-aligned Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) elements, the Esmael faction of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, the Maute Group, and Ansar Khalifah Philippines. USINDOPACOM stated that it relies on the AFP’s estimates of the different factions that comprise ISIS-EA.
This quarter, the DIA reported that the various ISIS-EA factions operating in the Philippines remained geographically separated and likely had minimal direct contact with one another. Last quarter, USINDOPACOM cited publicly available information indicating that ISIS-EA was incapable of carrying out large-scale attacks, which it has defined in previous quarters as having a casualty toll of greater than 100.
According to the DIA, ISIS-EA continued to operate this quarter without an internationally recognized leader, although some ISIS leaders regard Hatib Hajan Sawadjaan, an ASG faction leader, as the de facto “emir” of ISIS in the Philippines. A shura of ISIS-aligned ASG leaders appointed Sawadjaan as ISIS-EA’s overall emir in May 2018 following the death of former leader Isnilon Hapilon in 2017, according to the DIA. USINDOPACOM reported to the DoD OIG in previous quarters that the leaders of some ISIS-EA factions do not support Sawadjaan.
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ISIS-EA (ISIS East Asia) has an esimtated 300-500 members in the Philippines. These men are divided up among several factions. There is in unity among the groups and they do not have an internatiaonly recognized leader. Since the death of Isnilon Hapilion there has been no official leader though some have stepped forward to fill the gap.
According to U.S. Special Operations Command–Pacific (SOCPAC), U.S. special operations forces provided casualty triage and evacuation assistance when AFP assets were unavailable on three occasions this quarter. SOCPAC reported that, during these three instances, it assisted five AFP soldiers who were wounded while conducting operations in southern and central Mindanao. Additionally, SOCPAC reported to the DoD OIG that U.S. special operations forces partnered with the AFP and the PNP-Special Action Force, the special operations component of the PNP, to conduct a week-long combat casualty care training with the goal of building the independent casualty evacuation capabilities of the Philippine forces.
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U.S. forces helped evacuate wounded soldiers and casualties when AFP assists were not available to do so. They also helps trained the SAF in "combat casualty care training with the goal of building the independent casualty evacuation capabilities of the Philippine forces." Will the SAF and AFP be independent enough to run these operations with no assistance from the U.S. by the time the VFA expires in August?
The USINDOPACOM report stated that an interoperable security architecture between allies in the region is necessary to deter aggression, maintain stability, respond to man-made and natural disasters, and ensure freedom of navigation. USINDOPACOM also stated in the report that over the next 5 years, it plans to make investments in regional allies’ security infrastructure with the goal of enhancing their capability and interoperability. This includes the development of intelligence sharing to counter transnational terrorist threats.
According to the USINDOPACOM report, the DoD normally holds approximately 90 named military exercises in the Indo-Pacific region each year, such as the annual Balikatan exercise between U.S. and Philippine troops. In the report, USINDOPACOM identified these exercises as a key deterrent to possible aggression by China in what the Chinese government refers to as the “First Island Chain,” which includes the Philippines and the waters of the South China Sea. The report did not address how termination of the VFA would alter future military exercises in the Philippines.
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While the USINDOPACOM has a fie year plan for the region how they will look in the Philippines remains to be seen because of the termination of the VFA.
In response to a the DoS OIG request for information, the DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security reported that it provided nine courses and two consultations to Philippine security forces during the quarter through the DoS Antiterrorism Training Assistance program. According to the DoS, these engagements covered topics including digital forensics, social media investigations, investigating foreign terrorist fighters, crisis management, identifying and developing investigative information, protecting soft targets, and first response to terrorist incidents. The DoS reported that these engagements trained 213 students from the PNP and other Philippine government agencies, including the Bureaus of Investigation, Immigration, and Customs; the Office of Transportation Security; Manila Airport Authority; Civil Aviation Authority; Port Authority; and Coast Guard. The DoS reported that members of a variety of PNP units participated in these engagements, including the Special Action Force, explosive ordnance disposal, anti-cybercrime, anti-kidnapping, aviation security, intelligence, and security and protection. Separate from these engagements, the DoS reported that it continued making plans to build a Regional Counterterrorism Training Center in the Philippines for regional partner nations. The Philippine government agreed to a memorandum of understanding for the regional training center in August 2019, but the PNP later suspended the project for reasons it did not make clear to the DoS.
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The DoS (Department of State) continues to provide antiterrorism training to various agencies. In 2019 the DoS and the PNP agreed to construct a Regional Counterterrorism Training Center. This was to cost P520 million and be located in Cavite. The groundbreaking ceremony was held in October 2019.
As part of our deepening bilateral counterterrorism partnership, today, Philippine Police Chief General Oscar Albayalde and U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Sung Kim broke ground on a new state-of-the-art Regional Counterterrorism Training Center in the Philippines.
The U.S. and Philippine governments will construct and operate the center on the grounds of the PNP Academy in Silang, Cavite. The U.S. Department of State has secured Php 520 million ($10 million) in counterterrorism partnership funds to establish and jointly operate the center with the PNP.
Once constructed, the center will provide counterterrorism training for law enforcement units and personnel from the Philippines and regional partner nations.
The initiative comes in response to a request from the PNP for a state-of-the-art facility to provide enhanced regional counterterrorism training. The establishment of this center reflects the U.S.’ enduring commitment to support Philippine counterterrorism efforts and work together to address threats to peace and security in the region.
Why would the PNP request the US to build a Counterterrorism Training Center, break ground on it, and then suddenly call the whole thing off? Could it be because of Duterte's abrogation of the VFA?
Mindanao business leaders, such as the Davao City Chamber of Commerce and Industry, were quoted in media reports (before the COVID-19 pandemic) setting expectations that the end of martial law would bring investment and tourism that would lead to economic growth on the island. However, ISIS-EA maintains a persistent presence in the southern Philippines, despite 31 months of martial law, and continues to engage in combat with the AFP and PNP.
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According to this report marital law changed nothing. ISIS-EA maintains their presence and continues to engage the AFP and PNP. The NPA does too but this report is not focused on them.
In February, a whistleblower at the Philippine Bureau of Immigration reported a ring of corrupt officials selling illicit, un-scrutinized country entry to Chinese nationals, including some with criminal records. According to media reports, the whistleblower testified at a Philippine Senate hearing that 90 percent of the bureau’s staff were involved in the illegal enterprise. The hearing featured video and photographs of Philippine immigration agents escorting Chinese nationals, who had paid bribes equivalent to approximately $200, past immigration counter lines at the airport in Manila. The whistleblower described the system as providing a “package” deal, which would also include the foreigner’s departure from the Philippines, with additional fees for high-profile individuals or those with criminal records that might make legal entry impossible.
The DIA reported that it had not observed a significant influx of foreign terrorists moving into the Philippines this quarter, although Indonesian and Malaysian terrorists likely continue to view the southern Philippines as an attractive destination to escape counterterrorism pressure in their respective home countries.
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The headline for this section of the report is, "Visa Corruption Scandal Highlights Immigration Vulnerability in the Philippines." Remember the visa scandal a few months ago? It took up the headlines every day for almost a month. This scandal involved Chinese nationals but it could just have easily allowed foreign terrorists from anywhere to enter the country. Corruption makes the nation vulnerable to a plethora of dangers.
There are only about four pages left in this report and they are all about humanitarian assistance provided by the Department of State and USAID to various groups in the Philippines affected by terrorism.
There are only about four pages left in this report and they are all about humanitarian assistance provided by the Department of State and USAID to various groups in the Philippines affected by terrorism.
In response to a DoS OIG request for information, the DoS Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) reported that it partners with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees, asylum seekers, and victims of conflict in the Philippines. PRM reported that it provided a total of $6.3 million to the UNHCR and ICRC for their East Asia operations. PRM reported that a portion of this funding could be used in the Philippines.
PRM reported to the DoS OIG that it provided $3 million in regional funding to UNHCR, some of which could be used in the Philippines. UNHCR works with the Philippine government on assistance to IDPs in Marawi. PRM reported that UNHCR had conducted protection monitoring at 12 transitory sites this quarter, though, according to PRM, the COVID-19 outbreak and associated Philippine government measures had hampered this effort.
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USAID reported that it has committed nearly $64 million for humanitarian and recovery work in and around the city of Marawi since the 2017 crisis and that it continues to partner with the Philippine government to restore public services, expand economic development, promote peaceful dialogue, and improve health and education systems.
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USAID has donated millions to humanitarian efforts in Marawi since the 2017 siege and they have partnered with the Philippine government "to restore public services, expand economic development, promote peaceful dialogue, and improve health and education systems." Additionally they have partnered with the BARMM.
Last quarter, USAID awarded the contract for its FORWARD Bangsamoro activity, which is designed to provide support to the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority (BTA), the interim government of the BARMM. This quarter, USAID reported to USAID OIG that the program was still in the start-up phase. USAID reported that FORWARD Bangsamoro supports USAID’s recently released strategy for the Philippines, the Country Development Cooperation Strategy, and USAID’s development objective of strengthening democratic governance. The goal of FORWARD Bangsamoro is to bolster local governance through the development of more effective and accountable Bangsamoro government institutions. FORWARD Bangsamoro intends to meet this goal by accomplishing three objectives:
• Build the capacity of targeted regional government institutions, ministries, and the BTA to carry out essential governmental functions.
• Support the enactment of priority measures to complete the transition to the BARMM government.
• Increase citizen awareness of, and engagement in, the BTA and BARMM.
According to USAID, the initial phase of FORWARD Bangsamoro will use several metrics to identify the baseline in BARMM’s executive and legislative capacities through surveys, focus group discussions, ethnographic research, and stakeholder workshops.
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If USAID is so bad as some say, like Thinking Pinoy and Rigoberto Tiglao, because various media groups receive USAID funds, then why does the Philippine government allow them to work in the Philippines? Why does USAID have a strategy for developing the Philippines and why are they allowed to assist in the building of the BARMM into a functioning government? Do the leaders of the BARMM know that USAID is a CIA front?
That's the state of the war against terrorism in the Philippines according to the DoD's latest report. It seems as if not much has changed. Simply more of the same. However the abrogation of the VFA has thrown a real monkey wrench into the Operation Pacific Eagle program. Just how that will play out is not known and it seems the DoD is hoping that it will not be overturned. The next OPE-P report won't be out until the beginning of August.
