This is a wide ranging interview with Benigno Aquino from back in 1983. Snippets of this interview can be found across the internet taken out of context by Marcos revisionists to prove that Aquino was a politically ambitious man and thus no hero. As if Marcos was not a a politically ambitious man who faked his war service record and even contemplated INVADING THE PHILIPPINES in order to regain power after he was exiled to Hawaii.
It is none of my concern if Aquino is a hero or a villain. Such categories are entirely subjective. Aquino is objectively an important person in the recent history of the Philippines and this interview shows a side to him that is otherwise overlooked in this day and age of historical revisionism. Does anyone in this country know what a "Jeffersonian democrat" is? Doubtful!
This will be a very long article. It was a nine hour conversation. I hope you read it and I hope you find it insightful.
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| https://books.google.com.bz/books?id=q-YDAAAAMBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false |
A Conversation With Benigno Aquino
Before Benigno Aquino's fateful return to the Philippines, Mother Jones met with him in San Francisco. In a nine-hour conversation at his sister's house, we discussed a broad range of topics, but Aquino's primary concern was whether or not he should go home. It was a propitious time for us to speak with him, for he had that day already met with opposition leader Salvador Laurel, another former Philippine senator thrown out of the power structure by Ferdinand Marcos. Laurel had brought word from opposition groups in the Philippines. "It is time to come home, Ninoy," Aquino said Laurel had told him.
In his lap during our long conversation Aquino held a gift from friends in the Philippines: a book on the life of Mahatma Gandhi. "What do you suppose they meant by this Do you think they want me to become a martyr?" he asked me with a wry smile, followed by a cackle of laughter, something he used often to break the tension that built as he spoke of the solemn agenda facing his country.
Aquino was a third-generation politician. His grandfather fought against Spanish occupation of the Philippines. His father was a senator and cabinet minister. At 22, Aquino was the youngest mayor of his home town; at 28, he won the governorship of Tarlac province; at 34, he became the youngest senator ever in the Philippines, and it seemed likely he would become the youngest president of his country, succeeding Marcos in the 1973 elections. But Marcos ended Aquino's political dream by declaring martial law and throwing him into prison. He might still be there had Marcos not allowed him to travel to the United States for open-heart surgery.
After three years in Boston, teaching at Harvard University and at MIT, and pondering the political problems of his country, Aquino drew an interesting conclusion. Before Marcos dies, he believed, the country must be put on the road to democracy or it will languish in violence for years, as competing forces, topped by the military and Communists, battle for supremacy. "Marcos," Aquino told me, "is the key."
It was clear the day we spoke that the implications of going home weighed heavily on him. He felt that the longer he stayed in the United States, the more he faced the danger of becoming politically obsolete. Marcos had already successfully isolated him by keeping his name out of the censored media of the Philippines.
Aquino told Mother Jones that he would not run for political office in the Philippines. He would, instead, act as a conciliator, both amongst opposition leaders vying for power and between the opposition and Marcos. He al-ready seemed to be defining his role as mediator, referring to himself during the interview variously as a "moderate," an "elite oppositionist," a "Jeffersonian democrat" and a "Left-Socialist."
He felt that his role was to promote a moderate third force between Marcos and the Communists, a force, with which he believed Marcos would deal. He harbored an almost naive trust in the rationality of U.S. foreign policy, believing that the State Department ultimately learned from its own mistakes, and he felt that the only way the Philippines could be returned to liberal democracy was for the U.S. government to exert pressure on Manila.
Throughout the day our conversation was frequently interrupted by small children who came to chat and play with "Ninoy." He would quietly rub their heads for a moment, whisper something in their ears and send them off to play. —S.A.S.
MJ: There is a rumor that you are considering a move to Europe.
AQUINO: Yes, but I'm also thinking of going back home.
MJ: How can you go back home?
AQUINO: Why not? Face the firing squad.
MJ: What do you think Marcos will do?
AQUINO: Marcos loves the situation with me in the U.S. In the Philippines, I'm a thorn in his side.
MJ: Yes, but he could throw you in jail.
AQUINO: O.K., let's do that scenario. I go back to Manila tomorrow. Marcos has three options: Have me shot. Send me to jail. Let me out on house arrest. Or, free me.
MJ: Four options.
AQUINO: O.K., four. But he won't shoot me. He also won't free me, because he would like to have some kind of a leash on me. So, chances are good he will throw me back into jail or at least put me under house arrest. If he throws me in jail, I'll be the focus of international attention again, as I was seven years ago. He's supposed to have lifted martial law. So he will have to bring me to trial. If he brings me to trial, I have a forum.
MJ: And if he brings you to trial and you're convicted?
AQUINO: I still have a forum. Because then I go to the court of appeals. I can drag this on for five years. Meanwhile, I'm there and I'm delivering speeches. Now, I cannot fight Marcos politically: he has all the aces. I cannot fight him militarily: he has the armed forces. I cannot fight him economically: he has two, three billion dollars plus government budget. But I can drag him into one field where I can fight him, and that's the moral field. Imagine it, two leaders—one in prison and the other one in a palace. The contrast is great. One guy, sentenced to death, is released, goes to America, lives in comfort in Boston, then voluntarily comes back in self-abnegation. He goes back to prison because his people are suffering and he must share their suffering. Now, how the hell do you think Marcos will see that? It can be seen two ways. Either I'm the greatest human saint around or I'm a nut. Take your choice. Every day someone will suggest that he shoot me. But he won't shoot me.
MJ: He wouldn't have to do that. You've had heart surgery. And you take medicine.
AQUINO: Exactly. But if I die in his prison, do you think people will believe he didn't kill me? On the contrary. So, he will keep me alive because he knows the moment I die, I am the martyr like Martin Luther King. And he wouldn't want that.
The moment I go back, he will be in a dilemma. He'll keep me locked up for a while. But eventually he’ll release me . . . and have me run over by a truck—driven by a drunk. Then he'll give me a state funeral and say, "Well, he was a nice guy. I tried to help him, but he got hit by a drunk." The drunk, of course, will be brought to trial and given a life sentence. End of scenario. Another possibility: he lets me out, and the Communists knock me off. They blame Marcos. They have a martyr and they have eliminated a stumbling block. That is why Washington tells me, "You can't go home. You will give the Communists what they wanted all along." You see, the Commies hate me more than they do Marcos. To them we sing the same songs, we just don't belong to quite the same grouping. In the case of Marcos, the situation is very clear; it's Left and Right. In my case it's blurred because I'm a Left-Socialist, you see. Communists don't like Left-Socialists. They sing their song but they're not Commies.
MJ: So you really can't go home.
AQUINO: That's what Senator Laurel told me some people are saying.
MJ: Was Senator Laurel here in this country?
AQUINO: Yeah. He arrived yesterday. He's leaving for Manila tomorrow. We've been in conference for two days. The opposition sent him here, because it is now the consensus of a minority of the moderate leadership in the Philippines that I must stay out—because everything is going down so fast. They are afraid that if things turn sour they will all be eliminated. So someone must stay out, you see, to maintain a link to the outside world.
MJ: But the majority of the opposition would like you to come back?
AQUINO: Yeah. They feel that there must be something dramatic. You see, there must be something now to jolt the situation. Something that will be a symbol. Right now they're fragmented.
MJ: You seem intent on taking a moderate democratic route. Well, let me play devil's advocate for a moment. Maybe a Communist regime is right for the Philippines. It will give land reform to the peasants.
AQUINO: Maybe. But I'm not ready to accept that.
MJ: Is it possible that you're blinded by moderacy?
AQUINO: No, I'm blinded by democracy, as I was taught. In the same way that some of my countrymen are fanatics on Marxism, I'm a fanatic for Jeffersonian democracy. I still believe that it's the best way—with or without America. I do believe in that. I believe in a pluralistic society. I don't want to be regimented. I don't want to be able to read only one newspaper. If Marxism is so good, how come the traffic has been from East to West? Thousands of people escape from East to West. But I've never seen much traffic from West to East. I've been to Russia. I've been to the Communist countries. I've seen them. And empirically, the West is still ahead. In other words, in spite of the faults of Marcos, he's still an angel compared to the Communists.
MJ: Some Filipinos I've talked to feel that people of your background, the so-called elite opposition, are very much removed from what's actually going on in the Philippines. One person said that the Movement for a Free Philippines is really not that much different from Marcos, except that they are not authoritarian and they don't want to oppress human rights. But that if you come to power, the vertical structure of the Philippines will still exist, that it will be a society pegged upon personality and that agrarian land reform is something very foreign to you. Is that true?
AQUINO: Partly. But keep in mind that the people you are hearing those things from want a revolution. We want an evolution. These guys want to restructure society overnight. Well, you can't do that. They talk about the goddamn revolution. They've been in the hills for 30 years. It's us "elite" who spoke about land reform. It's us "elite" who brought the Philippines to where it is today.
Let me put it this way: none of these jokers that you talked to ever won a post as dogcatcher in my country. I've never lost an election. I have been elected by the entire Philippine people from north to south. Now who are they to say that they are better than us? I say to the same people you speak of, "You guys are here in America. You hate America virulently. You attack the goddamn bases. You attack the multinationals. So why don't you pack up and go to Russia?" Second, I say, "You are products of American education. Ph.D.s from Princeton and Berkeley. Now, if you are so brave, why don't you go home?" My credential is seven years and seven months in jail. What right have they to tell me that they are better Filipinos? I challenge them. Return free elections to my country and they won't get ten percent. They got to do it by the gun. I'm going to do it by the ballot. In my province they never won. You see, my biggest danger is not Marcos, it's the Communists, because they know I'm going to set them back 40 years. I go back home, friend, and they'll be back to nine percent.
I have met with Philippine Communists here in America. They are divided among themselves. They are battling like cats and dogs. They have split into three groups: the internationalist group, which is Moscow-oriented; the Maoist group, which is Beijing oriented; and the centrist group, the National Democratic Front, which is following the Eurocommunist model. All three groups are downplaying their Russian and Chinese connections and projecting their nationalist credentials to broaden their base and bring in the entire Left as a united front.
When I met them I said to them, "I respect your view; you respect my view. The first thing I will do if I ever become president is legitimize you guys. You're going to be allowed your freedom. Amnesty for all. Only one condition: don't pick up the gun. The moment you pick up the gun, I'm government. And I will hound you worse than Marcos does. But so long as you don't take up the gun —you go by the rules—you can attack me; you will have the freest press. You don't have the money? I'll give you a press. I'll give you equal time on television. You put up your electoral candidates. You win, brother, and I bring you to the palace and concede. Now that's belief. I believe in a pluralistic society; I believe in all the freedoms contained in the Jeffersonian concept." They said, "Aw, but we don't believe in elections. It's a bourgeois mechanism." "Fine. But tell me, geniuses of our people," I said, "how can you determine the mandate of the people short of an election? Now, you tell me, 'We are the vanguard party. We know best.' The hell you know best." Goddamn it, these jokers just don't trust elections. So, we can't agree; so I finally said, "Look, are we agreed that Marcos is bad for our people?" They said yes. "Well, then, let's just cooperate in removing Marcos."
MJ: But hasn't history shown that if an amnesty is given to Communists in jail, they will simply head to the hills and pick up guns?
AQUINO: That's their problem. But they know me, friend. I'll hound them, They pick up the gun on me and by George, they're going to be met by the gun. Enough is enough. I mean, Jesus Christ, these guys want the whole body. Now, the Filipino is a petit bourgeois; he loves private property. The poorest Filipino wants a little house he can call his own. He wants to educate his children. He believes in his god, whatever god that is. And he's anarchic. And on top of that, America for 70 years has brainwashed us about individual rights. This is the tide that the Communists are going against.
MJ: Have you learned anything from the Communists?
AQUINO: Oh, yeah. I owe some of my progressive ideas to them. Every time I meet them, I pick their brains. We just have to outvision them; we've got to outperform them. That's the only way to beat them.
AMERICAN INTERVENTION
MJ: What is the mood in the Philippines toward the United States?
AQUINO: It's hatred among the radicals. But disappointment moving toward hatred among the moderates. I mean, people today are hurting. My God, today Manila is the center of prostitution in Asia. When your young women start selling their bodies, my friend, that's the best indicator that your economy is bad. But when 14-year-old kids are peddled by their parents, you don't have to be an economist to know that you've hit bottom.
When I was a newsman, everybody used to laugh at me when I'd go to a foreign country. The first thing I would do is look for prostitutes. If there were between five and a dozen on one corner, then you'd know that the economy was shot. But if you couldn't find them, and had to go to the police and pay them to help you find a piece of tail, then you knew that the economy was booming—because women wouldn't sell their bodies. Look at the prostitution in the Philippines today. It's a sign of corruption at every level and of the total desperation of people. You can't talk to a single Filipino, except one connected with Marcos, who will tell you that the country is in good shape.
MJ: Is Uncle Sam listening to the plight of the Filipinos?
AQUINO: Nope. That's the sad part. And I think they're not listening because we are so low in their priorities. In 24 hours of Reagan's life, he gives us maybe one-tenth of one second, if any time at all. Reagan is bothered with NATO, the missiles, the MX, the budget, the deficit, whatever. Until the Philippines is burning, we're not going to catch his attention.
Now, you may ask: "Are you trying to tell me that America should interfere in your country?" But I'll tell you, you are interfering, for Pete's, sake. You're giving Marcos $500 million a year. You're giving him helicopters. You're giving him guns. Isn't that interference? You've given him $18 billion. The very fact that you bring Marcos here and toast him with bugles and everything - you're interfering. You've legitimized him in the eyes of the world. You've even legitimized him in the eyes of our people. You've given him superpower backing against hapless rebels and dissidents. Isn't that interference? If it isn't, then I don't know what interference means. You do not realize that just by being a superpower, whether you like it or not, America is intervening in the lives of everybody. When you sneeze, brother, we catch pneumonia. Now that is a fact of life. Even by your inaction you're intervening.
So why are you talking now about interference - you have been interfering from the turn of the century. We were free, for Pete's sake; you colonized us. And all I'm asking from you guys is, if you must interfere, interfere for good, not evil. Help us bring back freedom of the press. Help us bring back free elections. That is your ethos. That is your tradition. That is your belief. Now what's so hard about that?
MJ: What kind of a reception do you get in Washington?
AQUINO: [laughs] I argue myself blue in the face. When you have a hardnosed conservative there who believes it's better to be dead than Red, and the only way to talk to a Red is with more guns, you're really in bad shape.
MJ: How different was it with Carter?
AQUINO: Carter was not cemented to that view. In fact, Carter himself confessed that he thinks the Russkies are human beings and as human beings there's something good in them. Reagan does not share that. He begins with the proposition that the Russkies are devils and that there's nothing good in them. Carter belongs to the reform tradition that man is basically good and that we can therefore deal with the Russians. The Reagan view, stemming from the McCarthy era, is that they are evil. Don't even touch them. Give the Russians the slightest chance and they'll put one over on you. He says so time and time again.
MJ: Carter had a fairly decent human rights policy. But his relations with Marcos, when it came to the military bases and funding, were not that different from Reagan's.
AQUINO: Yeah. But Marcos was scared of Carter. He knew that basically this guy was in a different ball game. Sure, Carter placated Marcos because he needed the bases. But once the lease was signed, Carter reverted back to human rights. But with Reagan, Marcos thinks: Now that's some kid. He's a member of the team. It's a perception. Maybe it's not true, but that's exactly how Marcos perceives it. In the four years that Carter was in office he never invited Marcos to the White House; that was symbolic. Reagan sent the vice president to toast this guy. And then he rolled out the red carpet in the White House and said Marcos is the personification of moderation and reason in the world. Jesus! I mean, if you were Marcos, you'd say: "Oh, coach, call the shots, coach."
MJ: Do you think Reagan is representative of American attitudes toward the Philippines?
AQUINO: This Communist countryman of mine tells me all Americans are bad. I don't buy that. If you tell me some Americans are bad, I will agree with you. If you stretch that argument and tell me most Americans are bad, I may even accommodate you. But when you tell me all, I say bullshit. And when you tell me all multinationals are all bad, I can't agree. There are some multinationals that are good, and we must use them. How the hell are you going to progress without them? You can't. Of course, it behooves you to control these monsters in your country, and you can do that if you have the power. You have the laws and you have the sovereignty. You can even nationalize them. So why be scared of multinationals? You should be scared only if you're afraid you can be bribed. Then you should be scared. But no developing country in the world today can move forward without multinational support. We need technology transfer; we need capital transfer. We cannot live in isolation.
THREE SCENARIOS
MJ: What's going to happen in the Philippines in the future?
AQUINO: The scenario that will unfold in my country is similar to what is now happening in El Salvador. Actually it's more of a Guatemala-El Salvador combination. That's exactly where we are headed right now. Marcos will continue to plod along, which is O.K. with the Communists. The Communists love Marcos. They love him. He's the best thing that ever happened to them. From having 500 men under arms before martial law, they now have 17,000 —and they're expanding. They love him. He's their objective ally. And they certainly don't want him to go until they're good and ready.
Now, what will happen in the Philippines when Marcos goes? That's the big question. Let's say Marcos drops dead tomorrow. I think he's been able to set up a situation in which his wife will take over.
MJ: Even though he says that that won't be the case?
AQUINO: All the contending forces will yield to Imelda for one reason. Be-cause they will have to pull in the wagons. Otherwise, they know that, divided, they may all fall. All right, So now Imelda is the rallying point. Immediately the corruption will increase. Everybody will feather his nest. At that point, she will be nudged to the side and be made a scapegoat for the mess. Then, the military will take over. just as in Argentina. They will say, "Well, Imelda, we've given you your chance." But they will have made sure that she would fail. The military will make her the scapegoat and they will even throw her to the people. Then they will come in as the great savior of the republic. Now you have an authoritarian military regime. At this juncture. the Americans will have lost their maneuverability. if they withdraw support from the military, the Communists will take over. If they continue to support the military, then you will eventually have an actual confrontation between a U.S.-backed Philippine military and the Communists. The U.S. becomes a partner in the internal rebellion, exactly as they are in El Salvador.
So, through no effort on anyone's part, the guy just drops dead—God has decided it’s his time, and he goes. O. K. Now we start anew. As I said maybe Imelda takes over, and you're on the road to polarization. Or maybe a middle guy will appear. In a few months he's kicked out and you have a junta. That's one scenario.
The second scenario is armed revolution. Storm the palace, kick Marcos out: the Cuban, Nicaraguan model.
The third possibility is to negotiate a rational peaceful transition with Marcos, hoping. one, that he is aware of the present danger and., two, that he is patriotic enough to realize the time has come to return democracy to his people. Now that's a long shot. lt’s a very tong shot. but I do submit that that should he the direction of the moderate opposition. because the moment you go along with armed struggle, you develop a new cadre of leaders: the killers. And the killers of today can't be the leaders of tomorrow. No way. You see. when you emerge from armed revolution. it’s the muscleman, the guy who has killed ten thousand people, who emerges as leader. Today, some of the moderates (the philosophers) are being led by the wayside. But as Mao Zedong said, if you are not willing to use a dun when you draw it, don't enter into revolution. Now the dilemma of the moderate is, the moment you take that path. kid, you're an amateur compared to the Communists. They've been at it for 30 years. You will end up bedding with them. and then in the end like Nicaragua—they take over.
MJ: Lets assume the third scenario takes place, How would you approach Marcos?
AQUINO: Marcos will negotiate only out of fear. He will sit down at the table only under tremendous pressure. the same way that the Viet Cong negotiated with Kissinger. Only after "Rolling Thunder" [the massive U.S. bombing campaign] was unleashed and Haiphong was mined did they get serious. But if we went to Marcos now and asked him to negotiate. he'd say, -“Why should I negotiate With you? Who are you? You're amateurs." So how do you bring about the fear? The Communists on their own cannot bring Marcos to the table. But if they bring in Russia they may. Just as the Moslems never forced Marcos to negotiate until they brought in Khadafy. It is our conclusion [that of the moderate opposition] that at this juncture, short of getting cooperation from an external power, we cannot force Marcos to negotiate. He laughs at us. But if we bring in the United States, he might sit down.
Now, it is my contention that where Americans have no leverage, it is foolish to intervene. You are bound to fail. You would be the laughingstock of the world, for example, if you tried to get Russia out of Afghanistan. So long as you're not ready to unleash the nukes, the Russians will say, "Baloney. You have no leverage." But when America has leverage and does not use it to further democracy, then I say America is as guilty as the dictator.
MJ: Does America have enough leverage in the Philippines?
AQUINO: Definitely. Marcos owes $18 billion, mostly Wall Street loans. He has to roll over these loans annually. He's kiting; he's hurting. All right. He wants $2 billion for the bases, spread out over five years. He already got $500 million. He wants loans from the Inter-national Monetary Fund and the World Bank. He wants the State Department to tell the world that he's improving his human rights so that he can improve his image so that other international creditors will lend to him. Now when you take the totality of all this, well, Jesus, America carries a huge club.
MJ: So how would you use it?
AQUINO: If I were Reagan, I would go to Marcos and tell him: "Ferdie, we like you. You're a staunch friend of America. But we think, for your own good, for the good of your people, for the good of the alliance, for the good of the free world, for the good of the region, you have to liberalize. You've got to bring back freedom."
And Marcos might say, "Like what?" And Reagan would answer, "Well, why don't you sit down with the moderates? You might start by giving them freedom of the press. Ease up a little bit, man, because things might explode."
MJ: What happens, though, if the Reagan administration goes to Marcos to negotiate about the bases, and they say, in effect: "We'll look the other way on the human rights. All we want are the bases." What happens if that is Reagan's quid pro quo?
AQUINO: Then we're screwed. But I do not believe that the Americans are that dumb.
MJ: Try to convince me of that.
AQUINO: They've learned their lesson in Iran, in Nicaragua, in Cuba, in Vietnam. I mean, these guys in the State Department, they weren't born yesterday. They've been around there for the past 20 years, for Pete's sake. The academic journals are loaded with their works, so you cannot convince me that there are no right-thinking Americans —maybe not in a position to dictate policy, but at least to influence policy.
But there is a fear in the United States, a fear that if you delegitimize a regime, you may not be able to control the degree of its fall. If your people could just be sure that this guy will fall only ten percent, they would confront him. But they are afraid that if Marcos starts falling, there may not be a safety net below. At that point, what happens? They allowed the delegitimization of the shah and they got the mad ayatollah. They allowed the delegitimization of Somoza and they got the Sandinistas. They allowed the delegitimization of Batista and they got Castro. Now those are also lessons of history. So they are very cautious. They say: "What if we destabilize Marcos. and he hits bottom. Where are we?"
MJ: Is it too late to allow the delegitimization of Marcos and get Aquino?
AQUINO: Yeah. I think it is. The tragedy of tragedies, I submit, is that only Marcos can bring us back to democracy. Only Marcos. And tell you why. Marcos is the only man today who can decree a clean and honest election. Only Marcos—with his residual powers that can retire 20 generals with one stroke of the pen.
MJ: So you believe that Marcos really is the key?
AQUINO: I've already said that. In 1973 I wrote him a memo. I wrote him a detailed memo on how to bring the country back on track. He picked up a few points in that memo: he lifted martial law as I suggested; he called for elections as I suggested. But he was very selective. He liked the points that dovetailed with his own ideas. But other matters, which could have completed the picture, he junked. Still., I've always held that Marcos is the key, and if he goes tomorrow, by George, the Philippines is going to have a hell of a time until someone else emerges from the scramble.
MJ: What if you were that person?
AQUINO: If you made me president of the Philippines today, my friend, in six months I would he smelling like horseshit. Because there's nothing I can do. I cannot provide employment. I cannot bring prices down. I cannot stop the criminality spawned by economic difficulties. I mean, let's face it. When people are hungry, you can bring down St. Peter and you won't get a stable government. So, this must be anchored collectively on the free world.
MJ: What does Marcos think of your ideas?
AQUINO: I don't know. Marcos blows hot and cold. He wants to have his space in history, but like cautious American policy-makers, he also does not know what will happen if he starts delegitimizing himself. Marcos, too, has learned a lesson from history. A dictator must never, never give the appearance he has lost the will to fight. That's how Somoza died; that's how the shah died. He knows that the more he liberalizes, the braver the opposition becomes, because they are smelling blood, and he knows they will eventually go for the jugular.
MJ: Why did Marcos let you out of prison?
AQUINO; You know, Marcos is not completely gone. He doesn't want to be branded a cruel man. Marcos operated this way: "I want to be dictator, but a nice dictator (if you'll allow me). I don't want to hurt you. The entire garden of paradise is for all of us—so long as you don't talk politics. You can criticize anybody—the bishop, Reagan. You can criticize anybody. Just don't criticize one and my family, O.K.? Then, every-thing's fine with us. Oh, one more thing, if you want to be president, you go to jail, kid.”
MJ: What would you do about the bases if you were president?
AQUINO: "Out with the bases," say the radicals. I agree. But we cannot remove the bases tomorrow and destabilize that region, particularly while the Russians arc building in Camranh Bay. Otherwise we will surely be changing masters. But I'm going to tell America I don't want these bases permanently. The sooner you remove them, the better.
Going Home
MJ: If you decide to go back, would it be soon?
AQUINO: Yeah, it would have to be very soon.
MJ: By June?
AQUINO: Maybe sooner. You see, my problem right now is that I have a wife and five kids. Much as I have a responsibility for my people, I also have a responsibility for these five Filipinos I brought into this world. So I told Senator Laurel, I said, I would have to ask Washington whether they would allow my family to stay in this country for another two years. If not, I'll have to relocate them somewhere they will be safe. Otherwise, they will be pressure points. Marcos may not be able to pressure me, but Jesus, if they somehow get to my family, my children, you know, I don't know how I will react. So that's one.
Then, I have to set up a little trust fund for my youngest, because while four have already graduated—the fourth one is graduating from college this year, so somehow, somewhere, they will be able to survive—my youngest is only in the seventh grade. And so I must set up something for her. Not much—enough for college—but I'm in the process of doing that now, liquidating certain assets.
Having done that, that little private thing, I sort of like the idea of jumping into the fire. Maybe, just maybe, if I'm in prison and helpless, Marcos will be more inclined to talk to me. You know, if I have freedom to go to the press and all, he may not like that. But if he can control the conditions of our meeting in other words, he can hold me in isolation while he's talking to me and nobody would know—just maybe.
As I've told you, I'm not predisposed to say that Marcos is all evil. I think if I go there and give myself up, he will accept it as a token of sincerity. I think he will be more inclined to say, "Well, maybe this guy has something to say." He may not love me but he will respect me. I mean, you respect a hero because he does something that you can't do. In Marcos' wildest dreams, though, he would never expect that, because the conventional wisdom is: Aquino's not coming home. Jesus, I mean, he's no nut. You know, why should he? He's living well in Boston. He's in the best academic world. He can go around America. Go back there? To that two-by-four cell? No way.
That's the conventional wisdom. So, when I go back there, even those doubting Filipinos, even those Communists, deep in their hearts they will have some kind of respect: Jesus Christ, he's done it. With that as my leverage, I can parley. But who knows—someone might shoot me. But what the hell, you can die on a Monday, friend, or you can die on a Friday. We're all going to go. We've got to go somehow. I'd rather die before a firing squad to trigger a revolution for my people than get run over by a drunken driver in Boston.
