The ultimate and thus final quarterly report of Operation Pacific Eagle has been released. Let's take a look at what the US military has to say about the Philippines' war against terrorism for the past quarter of July to September.
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| Operation Pacific Eagle |
The first thing to note is that this indeed the final report of OPE-P.
Under Section 8L of the Inspector General Act, the Lead IG agencies cease quarterly reporting when the appropriations for an overseas contingency operation drop below $100 million in a fiscal year. In 2019, the Secretary of Defense rescinded the overseas contingency operation designation for OPE-P. Furthermore, FY 2020 appropriations for OPE-P were less than $100 million. As a result, our Lead IG reporting responsibilities reached sunset at the end of FY 2020, and this is our final report.
This does not mean the US is done with assisting the AFP in their fight against terrorism. Far from it. It just means this particular oversight operation which began after the end of the Marawi siege in 2017 is over.
Probably the biggest take-away from this report is that the threat of terrorism remains.
The DoD reported that it does not anticipate a significant change in the terrorist threat in the Philippines within the next 2 years.
That assessment is a bit more bleak than the public pronouncements of the AFP that the insurgency is on the wan and will be defeated by 2022 or any other projected date. In fact the status quo has been maintained according to this report.
Violence in the southern Philippines this quarter followed a pattern similar to previous quarters, with a steady stream of low-level violence punctuated by one larger-scale attack. On August 24, two explosions, likely perpetrated by individuals linked to ISIS-East Asia (ISIS-EA) or the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), occurred in close succession in the city of Jolo, the capital of Sulu province. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and U.S. Special Operations Command–Pacific (SOCPAC), a female suicide bomber detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device near a Philippine military vehicle parked outside a food market.
pg. 7
As horrifying as the Jolo attack in August was it was not out of the ordinary. Terrorists engage in small-scale attacks and the AFP fights back but then a large-scale attack occurs seemingly out of the blue. The US DOD says this is the typical pattern in the Philippines. The attack was widely reported in the media but the US military's role in assisting with the wounded was not.
SOCPAC reported that U.S. special operations forces assisted with the mass casualty triage resulting from the attack and provided medical airlift evacuation for two wounded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) soldiers. Four days later, U.S. forces transferred one of the wounded Philippine National Police (PNP) officers by helicopter to a hospital with a higher level of care than was available locally.
pg. 8
The report says the local support for ASG "diminished notably" during the last quarter but that such lack of support, in the form of persona-non-grata declarations, might not amount to much because of family bonds between ASG members and the public.
According to media reports, local elected leaders in the Sulu region often publicly denounce the ASG, but family bonds between ASG members and the population at large remain stronger than any local government antiterrorism initiatives.
p. 10
The media report mentioned is an Australian analysis of the Philippines' situation.
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| https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/violence-in-southern-philippines-highlights-resilience-of-militant-networks/ |
Because the ASG was established by disgruntled MNLF commanders, its resilience until now has been fostered by blood ties with MNLF personalities and politicians. This intricate web allows room for cooperation while facing a common enemy, such as the military, and while pursuing economic benefits, such as revenue generated by kidnappings.
Sulu mayors publicly denounce the ASG, but they often lack incentives to counteract its presence because of kinship ties or don’t have the capabilities to do so because of weak governance. This in turn gives ASG commanders such as Sawadjaan ample opportunity to draw on a base of young and deprived individuals for new recruits. The governance vacuum also allows the ASG to promote its ideology unimpeded, even if it’s directed at an external audience.
At the outer edges of the Sulu archipelago, violence has declined in recent years. But the largest island in the chain, Jolo, has remained the centre of gravity for continued conflict.
Since late 2018, Sulu has hosted an infantry division of the Philippine army with over 10 battalions that bear responsibility for a population of around half a million. Yet, despite the heavy military presence, the ASG, after several presidential announcements of operations and deadlines to eliminate it, hasn’t been defeated and continues operating from the mountainous town of Patikul and environs. Moreover, bad blood between the military and police has recently contributed to a schism within the local security apparatus, lowering trust in the national government.
Weak governance and a schismatic security apparatus contribute to the flourishing of terrorism in Sulu. This schism between the PNP and the AFP is most evidenced by the killing of 4 AFP intel officers by the PNP back in July.
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| https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1324517/jolo-shooting-traced-to-distrust-between-afp-pnp |
The killing of four Army intelligence officers by nine policemen in Jolo, Sulu, on June 29 may have been caused by distrust between operative of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, senators said on Wednesday.
“The problem is that you ground operatives do not see eye to eye. You do not personally know one another. All of you operate in one small area of Jolo, yet you do not know one another,” Sen. Ronald dela Rosa, chair of the Senate committee on public order and dangerous drugs.
Dela Rosa pointed out that the military in the area distrusted policemen because some of them have relatives in the Abu Sayaff group while the police have suspicions that some military officials have ties to illegal drugs.
Some of the PNP have relatives in ASG and they suspect that some AFP officials have ties to illegal drugs. A perfect storm of distrust.
This report stresses again the familial and clan connections of terrorists in the region as a reason why violence persists.
The DIA stated that members of ISIS-EA and other VEOs are closely connected to one another and to large swaths of the community through familial and clan bonds. Although the average citizen in the southern Philippines may not expressly support the actions of these terrorists, many likely have some type of connection to VEO members and do not want to work against family or clan members, according to the DIA. Additionally, average citizens are unlikely to work against VEOs overtly, such as by providing information to the police about terrorist members and activities, due to fears of retaliation.
pg.13
After this analysis the DOD goes on to note that the AFP has decided to degrade the insurgency rather than eradicate it. They also note that they support and encourage this approach.
In early 2018, President Duterte revised the AFP’s desired end-state from eradicating VEOs to degrading them. According to SOCPAC, this was a more realistic objective, given the resiliency of extremist groups in the Philippines. AFP counterterrorism leaders have emphasized the importance of neutralizing key terrorist leaders, a strategy that SOCPAC stated has previously resulted in the surrender of rank and file terrorist fighters.72
The AFP’s former commander in western Mindanao, Lieutenant General Cirilito Sobejana, stated that the removal of top terrorist leaders from the battlefield has created a domino effect down the ranks, prompting many terrorists to surrender after the group becomes headless. SOCPAC stated that U.S. military support for this strategy during and after the Marawi siege contributed to the surrender of hundreds of ISIS-EA fighters.
pg. 13-14
If you are a regular reader you would know that this degradation is part of the whole-of-nation effort in order to encourage terrorists to surrender. Even though the U.S. military supports this initiative they don't think it will last without sustained effort.
The DIA stated that the Duterte administration is attempting to implement a whole-of-government approach against radicalization through anticorruption campaigns, literacy and education programs, youth outreach initiatives, and economic development. However, the DIA assessed that the current efforts were unlikely to break the VEO recruitment chain.
Sustaining initiatives aimed at moderating local divisions and clan rivalries, improving BARMM governance capacities, and ensuring national government support for the BARMM might diminish some of the factors which drive radicalization and recruitment in the long term, according to the DIA. Additionally, the Philippine government’s ability to implement its disarmament program for former militants and to follow through on providing cash handouts, housing, scholarships, and sustainable livelihood opportunities for former fighters will likely have some mitigating impact on VEO recruitment.
As the Lead IG has observed over the course of reporting on OPE-P, the level of violence and VEO presence in the southern Philippines has remained relatively consistent since the end of the Marawi siege in October 2017.
U.S. special operations forces will continue to assist the Philippine security forces in their counterterrorism operations as long as their assistance is welcomed by the Philippine government. However, as reported by the DIA and USINDOPACOM, a sustained commitment by the Philippine government will be necessary to improve governance and socio-economic conditions in the country’s poorest and most unstable region. Lasting improvements to the systemic conditions that currently provide VEOs with a permissive operating environment and readily available recruiting pool will ultimately be necessary to reduce the terrorist threat to a level where the Philippine security forces will be able to combat it independently.
pg.14
There is more in this report but I will end here. That last analysis is very biting. The US DOD says without lasting improvements to the conditions which allow terrorists to operate the Philippines security forces, AFP and PNP, will not be able to combat the insurgency independently. What they are implying is that the AFP and the PNP are unable to combat the Islamic and Communist insurgencies without outside help. The AFP and PNP might resent that assessment but they still rely on the US for weapons and training.
